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INFORMATION AS POWER:
DEMOCRATIZING ENVIRONMENTAL DATA
Annie Brett*
Abstract
Environmental data systems have largely escaped scrutiny in the past
decades. But these systems are the foundations for evaluating
environmental priorities, making management decisions, and deciding
which perspectives to value. Information is the foundation of effective
regulation. The decisions regulators make about gathering, assimilating,
and sharing information are, in many cases, determinative of the outcomes
they reach. This is certainly true in the case of the environment.
This paper looks at how current environmental regulation has
created data systems that undermine scientific legitimacy and
systematically prevent stakeholder participation in environmental
decision-making. These data systems concentrate power within federal
and state agencies that are often ill-equipped to use this data effectively.
New calls to open environmental data have the potential to shift these
norms, but they will not be successful without fundamental restructuring
in the regulatory treatment of environmental data. This paper uses
fisheries management as a case study to expose how outdated data
perceptions and architectures are at the root of many current
environmental management failures. Technological innovation is
challenging many of these norms, creating opportunities for better
management that can only be achieved if agencies fundamentally rethink
environmental data management. I argue that federal agencies can
support better regulatory outcomes by creating Environmental Data
Offices and open data systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bert, a groundfish fisherman from Cape Cod, is subject to near-constant
government surveillance.1 Before leaving the dock on a fishing trip, he must submit
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1
See generally KEITH PORCARO, BUILDING A FISHERMEN FIRST DATA ECOSYSTEM
(2019) (reporting “opportunities and possible models for the New England groundfish
community to own, control, manage, and use fisheries data, with a particular focus on
governing electronic monitoring data”).
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a Pre-Trip Notification to his regional fisheries managers.2 Once on the water, his
location is continually monitored by a GPS sensor on his vessel and transmitted in
real-time back to NOAA’s Office of Law Enforcement. Depending on the trip, he
may be accompanied by a government observer who also tracks his location and
watches as he catches fish and brings them onboard. Alternatively, he could have an
electronic monitoring camera system installed that captures fishing footage for
review by regulators. Once he returns to the dock, he must self-report by submitting
a Trip Report of his own to regulators, including detailed information on where he
was fishing and how much fish he caught. When he sells his fish to a dealer, that
dealer is required to confirm with regulators how much of Bert’s fish they bought.
This current fisheries surveillance system generates vast quantities of data,
many of which are redundant. Bert, for instance, tracks his location using three
separate systems on any given trip. This data is automatically transmitted to various
parts of NOAA’s fisheries management administration and locked into agency data
silos where even different offices within the same agency may have difficulty
locating and using it. Bert must not only pay for the sensors and observers that
generate redundant data but will never himself have access to any data on his own
activities.
This is the new information age in environmental law.3 Over the last two
decades, scholars have pointed to the lack of information on environmental
conditions as a major impediment to environmental management and highlighted
the promise of emerging technologies to fill data gaps.4 But the reality is far from
achieving this promise. Yes, new technologies are generating new data on
environmental conditions. But systemic challenges throughout the data lifecycle
prevent this data from being used effectively to inform decision-making. Data is
often redundant, inaccessible, and unavailable to key stakeholders. Bert’s case is
being repeated in various forms throughout environmental regulation.
Data policy has become a hot-button topic outside of environmental law, with
many raising concerns about the consequences of large technology companies

2

Pre-Trip Notification System (Northeast), NOAA FISHERIES (June 25, 2020),
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/resource/tool-app/pre-trip-notification-system-northeast
[https://perma.cc/3YJA-LGN8] (explaining that all owners and operators of vessels in
specified fisheries are “required to notify Northeast Fisheries Observers Program prior to
each trip” of their fishing plans).
3
For an early take on the promise of the information age to improve and expand
environmental management, see generally Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the
Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115 (2004). (“[W]e stand on the verge of an
environmental revolution perhaps as important as that which launched the modern
environmental movement four decades ago.”).
4
Gregg P. Macey, The Architecture of Ignorance, 6 UTAH L. REV. 1627, 1632 (2013)
(arguing that data “allows us to explore a broader range of transaction costs that shape our
response to environmental harms”); Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring,
83 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2011); Esty, supra note 3, at 188 (suggesting that addressing
information gaps represents a key to environmental progress).
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holding data monopolies.5 The massive quantities of data collected by Google,
Facebook, and others exacerbate existing imbalances of power and concentrate
power in the hands of those that hold data.6 While big tech is the focus of public
scrutiny, private companies are certainly not the only ones holding large and
strategically important data monopolies. The federal government also owns massive
amounts of data. Federal agencies engage in similar data collection and storage
practices that in many ways mimic the practices of private enterprises. These federal
data monopolies are no less dangerous.
In the context of environmental law, federal government data monopolies
significantly impede effective environmental management.7 Most environmental
data is a regulator-driven ecosystem, where data is collected for government
purposes and incorporated into legislatively created data systems that, at their best,
are merely inefficient. For instance, despite the plethora of data on individual fishing
activity mandated by regulators, our gaps in understanding of fisheries are massive,
undermining management goals and leading to rampant overexploitation of this
resource.8 This is not true only in fisheries: EPA and other agencies are struggling
with how to manage vast volumes of data at the same time as they lack information

5
See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Approves Facebook Fine of About $5 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES (July 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/technology/facebook-ftcfine.html [https://perma.cc/JJ4C-4DV3] (describing the reaction to Facebook’s mishandling
of data in the Cambridge Analytica scandal); Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 6:
Examining the Dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com. and Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong.
(2020) (raising congressional concerns about the power of large technology companies and
their data practices).
6
See, e.g., Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1599 (2018) (“[W]e must abandon
traditional doctrinal and regulatory analogies and understand these private content platforms
as systems of governance. These platforms are now responsible for shaping and allowing
participation in our new digital and democratic culture, yet they have little direct
accountability to their users.”).
7
See infra Section III.B (discussing the problems with government data monopolies).
8
Malin L. Pinsky, Olaf P. Jensen, Daniel Ricard & Stephen R. Palumbi, Unexpected
Patterns of Fisheries Collapse in the World’s Oceans, 108 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. U.S.
8317 (2011); David A Kroodsma, Juan Mayorga, Timothy Hochberg, Nathan A. Miller,
Kristina Boerder, Francesco Ferretti, Alex Wilson, Bjorn Bergman, Timothy D. White,
Barbara A. Block, Paul Woods, Brian Sullivan, Christopher Costello & Boris Worm,
Tracking the Global Footprint of Fisheries, 359 SCI. 904 (2018).
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on basic ecosystem conditions across all sectors of the environment.9 Current
environmental data systems are unable to meet their core goal of enabling sciencebased environmental management.10
Moreover, current methods of collecting, storing, and disseminating
environmental data systemically exclude the majority of stakeholders.11 The ways
that agencies view environmental data are rooted in outdated concerns about
confidentiality initially aimed at protecting stakeholder interests but that now
actively prevent their engagement in resource management. As a result, fishermen
like Bert do not have access to the vast quantities of data collected about their own
fishing activities. Critical data on coastal storms and sea level rise collected by
FEMA is essentially unavailable to people looking to purchase homes in coastal
areas. Data on drinking water quality is not disseminated to the public, even when
water is so contaminated that it becomes a public health crisis.12
Opening data to stakeholders leads to the addition of new sources of data, new
perspectives, and more meaningful stakeholder engagement.13 Stakeholder
engagement is particularly important in overcoming historic environmental injustice
and inequity.14 Access to environmental data is a critical component of participatory
environmental management that includes marginalized communities.15 All of this
leads to better environmental decision-making.
This Article begins in Part II by laying out the importance of environmental
data, both as a tool to support agency decision-making and as a vehicle for engaging
stakeholders in environmental management. It shows how current regulatory data
systems have been structured in ways that make achieving either of these goals
impossible. It argues that deficiencies in data structures are becoming more critical
in the face of improving environmental technologies. Current large-scale calls for
open environmental data have been unsuccessful because they discount the
importance of these structural barriers. Part III looks at fisheries data as a case study
9

See, e.g., NOAA Expands Public Access to Big Data, NAT’L CTRS FOR ENV’T INFO.
(Dec.
10,
2018),
https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/noaa-expands-big-data-access
[https://perma.cc/WWN6-9JU2] (discussing the challenges NOAA faces in storing
oceanographic and climate data); Biber, supra note 4, at 20–21 (describing the gaps in
environmental data availability).
10
Robin O’Malley, Anne S. Marsh & Christine Negra, Closing the Environmental Data
Gap, 25 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 69, 69–74 (2009); Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan
Mendelson, Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process:
Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 933, 940 (2009).
11
See infra Part III.
12
See Mitch Smith, Julie Bosman & Monica Davey, Flint’s Water Crisis Started 5 Years
Ago. It’s Not Over., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/
flint-water-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/L9XL-AKV2].
13
See Thomas C. Beierle, The Quality of Stakeholder‐Based Decisions, 22 RISK
ANALYSIS 739, 739 (2002).
14
Jason Corburn, Bringing Local Knowledge into Environmental Decision Making, 22
J. PLAN. EDUC. & RSCH. 420, 429–30 (2003).
15
See Thomas C. Beierle & David M. Konisky, Values, Conflict, and Trust in
Participatory Environmental Planning, 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 587, 598–99 (2000).
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to understand how foundational decisions about how data is collected and stored
impact regulatory efficiency. It focuses on two technological innovations—public
transparency and electronic monitoring—to show how outdated regulatory data
structures are undermining the potential of new technological tools to improve
management and enable broader stakeholder participation. It draws on fisheries and
other case studies to show how government-dominated environmental data systems
prevent positive environmental outcomes. Part IV uses lessons from fisheries data
to propose reforms to environmental data management: creating Environmental
Data Offices in agencies and rethinking confidentiality norms to provide open access
to environmental data. These changes are needed to support sustainable
development outcomes and to engage disparate and often marginalized
environmental stakeholders.
II. UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL DATA
We know very little about many ecosystems of the planet. The gaps in our
knowledge of global environmental conditions are pervasive.16 And yet, informed
decision-making about the environment is impossible without accurate baseline
information.17
While there has been considerable discussion in the legal academy of how to
fill gaps in scientific data to drive better environmental regulation, these discussions
neglect to address the impacts of the broader environmental data systems that these
regulations create.18 Early attention to environmental data systems by Gregg Macey
highlights how an increasingly data-rich ecosystem will demand the reworking of
16
See Sara M. Maxwell, Elliott L. Hazen, Rebecca L. Lewison, Daniel C. Dunn, Helen
Bailey, Steven J. Bograd, Dana K. Briscoe, Sabrina Fosette, Alistair J. Hobday, Meredith
Bennett, Scott Benson, Margaret R. Caldwell, Daniel P. Costa, Heidi Dewar, Tomo Eguchi,
Lucie Hazen, Suzanne Kohin, Tim Sippel & Larry B. Crowder, Dynamic Ocean
Management: Defining and Conceptualizing Real-Time Management of the Ocean, 58
MARINE POL’Y 42, 42 (2015); Biber, supra note 4, at 4; R.H. Thurstan, L. McClenachan,
L.B. Crowder, J.A. Drew, J.N. Kittinger, P.S. Levin, C.M. Roberts & J.M. Pandolfi, Filling
Historical Data Gaps to Foster Solutions in Marine Conservation, 115 OCEAN & COASTAL
MGMT. 31, 31 (2015); Abby J. Kinchy & Simona L. Perry, Can Volunteers Pick Up the Slack?
Efforts to Remedy Knowledge Gaps About the Watershed Impacts of Marcellus Shale Gas
Development, 22 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 303, 303–23 (2012); Gordon D. Blasco,
Danielle M. Ferraro, Richard S. Cottrell, Benjamin S. Halpern & Halley E. Froehlich,
Substantial Gaps in the Current Fisheries Data Landscape, FRONTIERS MARINE SCI., Dec.
17, 2020, at 1, 2.
17
See Biber, supra note 4, at 4; Linwood H. Pendleton, Hawthorne Beyer, Estradivari,
Susan O. Grose, Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, Denis B. Karcher, Emma Kennedy, Lyndon
Llewellyn, Cecile Nys, Aurélie Shapiro, Rahul Jain, Katarzyna Kuc, Terry Leatherland, Kira
O’Hainnin, Guillermo Olmedo, Lynette Seow & Mick Tarsel, Disrupting Data Sharing for
a Healthier Ocean, 76 ICES J. MARINE. SCI. 1415 (2019).
18
Biber, supra note 4, at 14–18 (discussing how more ambient environmental data is
needed to support management); Esty, supra note 3, at 118 (arguing that new technologies
are broadening available environmental information and enabling a new era of regulation).
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fundamental data architectures. Others have expanded on this, noting how the shift
away from data as a limiting factor in environmental decision-making can increase
the political value of data, particularly the value to agencies of keeping data closely
held.19
This section explores the role of environmental data in supporting management
decisions and argues that beyond its core scientific function, environmental data
serves a critical role in enabling stakeholder engagement in environmental
management. I show here how current regulatory data systems exacerbate existing
environmental injustices and inequity by systematically excluding certain types of
external participation, in addition to not meeting their goals of providing a
scientifically accurate basis for management decisions. I then examine how
technology is changing the landscape of environmental data and challenging existing
data structures.
A. What Is Environmental Data?
Data on baseline environmental conditions is the foundation for environmental
management decisions.20 Understanding current ecosystem conditions and
accurately predicting future impacts is an essential function of environmental
scientists and managers. To do this, managers rely on many different types of data,
both scientific data but also social and economic data.
Environmental science data ranges from biological assessments of species
density to pathogen concentrations in coastal waters to hydrogeographic models of
river flows to simple atmospheric measurements of temperatures.21 These are the
scientific measurements of baseline environmental conditions that inform
understanding of the current environmental condition. Environmental science data
also includes complex model outputs predicting the impacts of future carbon dioxide
emissions on global ecosystems.
These types of scientific measurements are generally quantitative data.
However, different methods of measurement can lead to data with different units
and uncertainty factors that make it very difficult to compare even measurements of
the same condition. For instance, atmospheric pressure is commonly measured both
in inches of mercury and millibars. To be usable, before these data are entered into
a database, they need to be converted to an agreed-upon standard unit.22
Environmental data also includes social data. Understanding human pressure
on and interaction with local environments is essential to weighing management
priorities and developing feasible solutions. This social data is sometimes
19

Ryan P. Kelly, Will More, Better, Cheaper, and Faster Monitoring Improve
Environmental Management?, 44 ENV’T. L. 1111, 1142 (2014) (“Another issue with a more
powerful microscope is the potentially inconvenient data that the microscope might reveal.”).
20
See Biber, supra note 4, at 14–18 (discussing the importance of monitoring data in
environmental management).
21
Id. at 16–22 (listing different environmental monitoring programs).
22
Determining standardized units across scientific communities is incredibly difficult.
See, e.g., Pendleton et al., supra note 17, at 1416, 1418–19.
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quantitative, for instance, demographic variables or economic calculations, but is
also frequently qualitative. Qualitative social environmental data includes
community perceptions of environmental conditions, traditional ecological
knowledge, and other types of information that are important for decision-making
but that are very difficult to include in more traditional environmental databases.
One of the key challenges of environmental data is how to effectively collect,
use, and disseminate these diverse types of data.
B. Environmental Data Collection
The majority of the data used by federal managers is collected by the agencies
that use it, from EPA to NOAA to DOT: ambient environmental monitoring is an
essential public function.23 Environmental scientists also contribute important data
sources and analysis, but this is generally less tied to specific regulatory outcomes.
Environmental data must be collected both frequently and over long intervals
to be effective in supporting environmental decision-making.24 Frequent data
collection is needed to effectively monitor environmental conditions that change
rapidly. In some ecosystems, rivers, for example, conditions can change on an hourly
basis in response to different weather events or human activities.25 Frequent
monitoring is needed to understand these changes and inform river users about
unsafe conditions in near real-time.26 Likewise, human activities also need to be
monitored frequently as they can change quickly. Industrial outputs and wastewater,
for instance, need to be monitored constantly to ensure compliance with
environmental regulations.27 Frequent monitoring is costly and logistically
difficult.28
Long-term environmental data is equally important. Scientists often need
decades of data to accurately identify ecosystem trends. The poster child of climate
change science, the Keeling Curve, required over 20 years of ambient observations
before scientists began to point out increasing carbon dioxide levels in the
23

Id. at 1415–16.
See, e.g., Kinchy & Perry, supra note 16, at 338 (discussing the data needs in
environmental law).
25
See, e.g., Rebecca N. Handcock, Christian E. Torgersen, Keith A. Cherkauer, Alan R.
Gillespie, Klement Tockner, Russel N. Faux & Jin Tan, Thermal Infrared Remote Sensing of
Water Temperature in Riverine Landscapes, FLUVIAL REMOTE SENSING FOR SCI. & MGMT.
85, 96–98, 103 (Patrice E. Carbonneau & Hervé Piégay eds., 1st ed. 2012) (describing typical
fluctuations in river water temperature and composition over time).
26
Robert L. Glicksman, David L. Markell & Claire Monteleoni, Technological
Innovation, Data Analytics, and Environmental Enforcement, 44 ECOL. L. Q. 41–88 (2017).
27
In these compliance cases, the burden for monitoring generally has been shifted onto
the
regulated
entities.
See
How
We
Monitor
Compliance,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/compliance/how-we-monitor-compliance
[https://perma.cc/SM9S4LDP] (last visited Aug. 14, 2021). Data generated by industrial actors is submitted to federal
regulators for review and storage. See id.
28
Biber, supra note 4, at 32.
24
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atmosphere.29 Similarly, long-term datasets have helped illuminate key
environmental issues, from the loss of biodiversity to the discovery of the ozone
hole.30
Long-term environmental datasets are notoriously rare. Ambient environmental
monitoring over time is not the type of cutting-edge research that garners substantial
funding. Very few entities provide the funding commitments needed to support these
projects.31 Keeling’s studies of carbon dioxide, for example, were initially funded
by the U.S. government not as a long-term study, but because Keeling had come up
with a new, more precise method of measuring carbon dioxide concentrations.32
Keeling spent the next decades of his life defending the need to continue taking
measurements to government funders that viewed his work as “routine.”33 This
“routine” work became the critical basis for most climate change research today.
Despite the importance of this project, the U.S. government finally discontinued
funding for the Keeling observations in 2014.34 Private technology billionaires Eric
and Wendy Schmidt stepped in to continue funding the work going forward.35 Most
long-term environmental datasets lack the notoriety or support of the Keeling Curve,
making funding struggles even more acute.
Environmental data must also be collected at as high a spatial resolution as
possible. Environmental conditions are highly location-specific and can vary
dramatically over small spatial scales.36 Climate global circulation models, for
instance, predict climate impacts for areas of 100 to 300 square kilometers.37 This
29

Daniel C. Harris, Charles David Keeling and the Story of Atmospheric CO2
Measurements, 82 ANAL. CHEM. 7865 (2010).
30
Graham J Edgar, Rick D. Stuart-Smith, Trevor J. Willis, Stuart Kininmonth, Susan
C. Baker, Stuart Banks, Neville S. Barrett, Mikel A. Becerro, Anthony T. F. Bernard, Just
Berkhout, Colin D. Buxton, Stuart J. Campbell, Antonia T. Cooper, Marlene Davey, Sophie
C. Edgar, Günter Försterra, David E. Galván, Alejo J. Irigoyen, David J. Kushner, Rodrigo
Moura, P. Ed Parnell, Nick T. Shears, German Soler, Elisabeth M. A. Strain & Russell J.
Thomson, Global Conservation Outcomes Depend on Marine Protected Areas with Five Key
Features, 506 NATURE 216, 216 (2014) (discussing how global conservation targets for
marine protected areas based on area alone does not optimize protection of marine
biodiversity); Susan Solomon, The Discovery of the Antarctic Ozone Hole, 575 NATURE 46
(2019).
31
F. Stuart Chapin III, Erika S. Zavaleta, Valerie T. Eviner, Rosamond L. Naylor, Peter
M. Vitousek, Heather L. Reynolds, David U. Hooper, Sandra Lavorel, Osvaldo E. Sala, Sarah
E. Hobbie, Michelle C. Mack & Sandra Día, Consequences of Changing Biodiversity, 405
NATURE 234, 234–242 (2000).
32
Harris, supra note 29, at 7866.
33
Id. at 7870.
34
Robert Munroe, Keeling Curve Receives Continuation Funding from Eric and Wendy
Schmidt, UCSD NEWS (Oct. 15, 2020), https://scripps.ucsd.edu/news/keeling-curvereceives-continuation-funding-eric-and-wendy-schmidt# [https://perma.cc/2JK3-CSEX].
35
Id.
36
Biber, supra note 4, at 22.
37
Tongli Wang, Andreas Hamann, Dave Splittlehouse & Carlos Carrol, Locally
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leads to a great deal of uncertainty about impacts on more localized areas, making
decision-making difficult for environmental managers and members of industry.38
Scientists recommend using data at the 4-kilometer level, or even smaller in highly
heterogeneous ecosystems, to support accurate decision-making.39
The challenge of environmental data is a multi-pronged one: environmental
decision-making requires high-quality data from a broad range of scientific
disciplines, collected as frequently and consistently as possible over a period of
decades at the small spatial scales that allow for locally disparate impacts to be
understood. This is a tall order.
New efforts are broadening the scope of who collects environmental data
beyond traditional groups of scientists and agencies. Citizen science, for instance, is
involving members of the public in data collection.40 Volunteers help to carry out
water quality monitoring under the Clean Water Act and are spearheading a new
wave of public participation in environmental data collection.41
1. Environmental Data Classification and Storage
Cleaning, categorizing, and storing environmental data is an often overlooked
portion of its lifecycle. But this type of data management is critical for creating
usable, accessible datasets. Creating effective data management systems is
particularly important as volumes of data being collected increase exponentially.
The largest problems in this stage for environmental data stem from a lack of
resources devoted to this critical stage.42 Often data is collected and then sent in its
Downscaled and Spatially Customizable Climate Data for Historical and Future Periods for
North America, PLOS ONE, Jun. 8, 2016, at 1–2.
38
L. O. Mearns, W. Easterling, C. Hays & D. Marx, Comparison of Agricultural
Impacts of Climate Change Calculated from High and Low Resolution Climate Change
Scenarios: Part I. The Uncertainty Due to Spatial Scale, 51 CLIMATE CHANGE 131, 131–33
(2001) (discussing the growing prominence of spatial scale as an important uncertainty).
39
Wang et al., supra note 37, at 3–4.
40
Citizen Science, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclope
dia/citizen-science/ [https://perma.cc/4FQ2-LGPL] (last visited Sept. 7, 2021) (“Citizen
science is the practice of public participation and collaboration in scientific research to
increase scientific knowledge. Through citizen science, people share and contribute to data
monitoring and collection programs.”).
41
Kinchy & Perry, supra note 16, at 328–29.
42
Toste Tanhua, Sylvie Pouliquen, Jessica Hausman, Kevin O’Brien, Pip Bricher,
Tacode Bruin, Justin J.H. Buck, Eugene F. Burger, Thierry Carval, Kenneth S. Casey, Steve
Diggs, Alessandra Giorgetti, Helen Glaves, Valerie Harscoat, Danie Kinkade, Jose H.
Muelbert, Antonio Novellino, Benjamin Pfeil, Peter L. Pulsifer, Anton Van de Putte, Erin
Robinson, Dick Schaap, Alexander Smirnov, Neville Smith, Derrick Snowden, Tobias
Spears, Shelley Stall, Marten Tacoma, Peter Thijsse, Stein Tronstad, Thomas Vandenberghe,
Micah Wengren, Lesley Wyborn & Zhiming Zhao, Ocean FAIR Data Services, 6 FRONTIERS
MARINE SCI., Aug. 7, 2019, at 1–4 (explaining the main challenges against moving ocean
data management toward the FAIR principles of being findable, accessible, interoperable,
and reusable).
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messy form to be stored on various office servers.43 It may not be cleaned or
cataloged. Individuals beyond the one receiving the data likely do not know it exists,
or if they do, how to access and use it.
Global efforts have focused on improving and standardizing metadata, the
contextual information such as time and date that is attached to the data itself. These
efforts have made important progress in the scientific communities, ensuring that
data collected by different individual scientists in different countries is interoperable
and can all be added to global environmental datasets.
Just to integrate scientific data into large global databases is an extremely
resource-intense endeavor. Cleaning and formatting data so it meets agreed-on
standards and quality control criteria is essential for creating usable datasets, but
agencies and others have failed to devote sufficient resources to this area.
2. Environmental Data Use and Access
Effective environmental management depends not just on accurate data about
environmental conditions but also on external engagement with environmental
stakeholders.44 Stakeholder engagement contributes to regulatory legitimacy.45 Data
is a foundational component of effective stakeholder engagement.46
Information transparency is a critical element of effective environmental
governance.47 Providing data on environmental conditions to members of the public
can widen participation and increase buy-in for environmental decision-making.48
This is particularly important over the long term, where providing meaningful
opportunities for engagement between stakeholders and managers is essential to
43

Pendleton et al., supra note 17, at 1416.
See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in
Governing Science, 41 MINERVA 223, 232 (2003) (noting the position by Funtowicz and
Ravetz that peer review should be extended to include stakeholders affected by the use of the
science).
45
Coglianese et al., supra note 10, at 927 (“[T]ransparency and public participation are
. . . tools that can enhance regulators’ ability to achieve society’s goal of high-quality and
legitimate rules.”).
46
See generally NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern, eds., 2008) (studying
the merits and failings of participation that concludes with ‘best processes’ that can enhance
effective participation and thereby improve environmental assessment).
47
See, e.g., Matilda T. Petersson, Transparency in Global Fisheries Governance: The
Role of Non-Governmental Organizations, MARINE POL’Y, July 9, 2020, at 1 (“Transparency
is recognized as a critical component of good governance that can enhance governance
capacity and the effectiveness to solve complex environmental problems.”).
48
See, e.g., R. Kingston, S. Carver, A. Evans & I. Turton, Web-Based Public
Participation Geographical Information Systems: An Aid to Local Environmental DecisionMaking,
24
COMPUT.
ENV’T
&
URB.
SYS.
109
(2000),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0198971599000496 [https://perma.cc/N
B2S-DVKY]; Gene Rowe & Lynn J. Frewer, Public Participation Methods: A Framework
for Evaluation, 25 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 3 (2000).
44
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reducing conflict in the face of complex and dynamic issues.49 Current proposals to
shift the focus in environmental law from sustainability to resilience also note the
importance of considering social interactions with the law, of which access to data
is a critical piece.50
Transparency increases the likelihood that regulated entities will comply with
a final rule.51 In the context of environmental regulations, many of which lack
meaningful enforcement, this is a critical consideration. Transparency, moreover, is
particularly important when agency decisions unequally burden certain groups.
Understanding why agencies made the decisions can ensure these “losers” still find
legitimacy in the process.52
The Obama Administration recognized the problems inherent in governments
holding data too tightly and pushed for more openness and transparency in data
reporting by federal agencies.53 In response to the Open Government Action Plan,
agencies made hundreds of thousands of data sets available to the public.54 These
are important efforts, and the move towards data transparency is beginning to be
embraced in many different areas of environmental management.55 At its best,
transparency can promote stakeholder engagement and support of environmental
policies. Transparency alone will not achieve these goals,56 but evidence suggests

49

Christina H. Drew, Timothy L. Nyerges & Thomas M. Leschine, Promoting
Transparency of Long‐Term Environmental Decisions: The Hanford Decision Mapping
System Pilot Project, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 1641, 1642 (2004).
50
Robert L. Fischman, Letting Go of Stability: Resilience and Environmental Law, 94
IND. L.J. 689 (2019).
51
See Coglianese et al., supra note 10, at 926–28.
52
Id. at 927.
53
THE OPEN GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP: NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/us_
national_action_plan_final_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8MB-JUWU].
54
Id. at 2.
55
See Sheila Jasanoff, Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits, 69
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21 (2006) (discussing environmental management generally); Ruth
A. Davis & Quentin Hanich, Transparency in Fisheries Conservation and Management
Measures, MARINE POL’Y, June 19, 2020, at 1 (explaining how transparency impacts
fisheries); Rosemary Lyster, REDD+, Transparency, Participation and Resource Rights:
The Role of Law, 14 ENV’T SCI. POL’Y 118, 123–26 (2011) (analyzing ways to facilitate
transparency in forest management); Mehdi Azadi, Stephen A. Northey, Saleem H. Ali &
Mansour Edraki, Transparency on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Mining to Enable
Climate Change Mitigation, 13 NATURE GEOSCIENCES 100, 103 (2020) (suggesting ways to
increase transparency in the mining industry).
56
See generally Aarti Gupta, Transparency Under Scrutiny: Information Disclosure in
Global Environmental Governance, 8 GLOB. ENV’T POL., May 2008, at 1 (discussing barriers
to achieving meaningful transparency); Anna Wesselink, Jouni Paavola, Oliver Fritsch &
Ortwin Renn, Rationales for Public Participation in Environmental Policy and Governance:
Practitioners’ Perspectives, 43 ENV’T PLAN. 2688 (2011).
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that little progress can be made without data transparency.57 Stakeholders can also
participate in the production of environmental data, broadening the information
available for environmental decision-making.58
Beyond transparency, data ownership can expect to become a more central
issue for many stakeholder communities. In the case of fisheries, discussed in Part
IV, fishermen are increasingly interested in owning and controlling the data
collected by the government about their activities.
Similarly, a global movement towards indigenous data sovereignty recognizes
the importance of giving tribal communities control over their own data for
improving management outcomes.59 In the case of indigenous data, data monopolies
by the federal government have exacerbated existing inequities.60 Federal agencies
collect the vast majority of data on tribal populations.61 These agencies decide what
data is needed and then collect and analyze this data before sharing it in limited
amounts with tribal governments. Tribes are not involved in designing data
collection methodologies, undermining the accuracy and usability of federally
generated data.62 This state of “data dependence” limits the data available to tribes
to that which the federal government deems necessary. Some have gone so far as to
equate territorial sovereignty with data sovereignty.63
Other stakeholders, like academic researchers, are also barred from engaging
with environmental data. Empirical studies are much less common in environmental

57

See, e.g., Jeff A. Ardron, Henry A. Ruhl & Daniel O.B. Jones, Incorporating
Transparency into the Governance of Deep-seabed Mining in the Area Beyond National
Jurisdiction, 89 MARINE POL’Y 58, 63 (2018) (discussing how a lack of public awareness of
deep-sea mining or its dangers undermines effective regulation); Anne N. Glucker, Peter P.J.
Driessen, Arend Kolhoff & Hens A.C. Runhaar, Public Participation in Environmental
Impact Assessment: Why, Who and How?, 43 ENV’T IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 104 (2013)
(describing the essential role of public participation in environmental impact assessment).
58
See, e.g., Christine Overdevest & Brian Mayer, Harnessing the Power of Information
Through Community Monitoring: Insights from Social Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1493 (2008);
Gwen Ottinger, Buckets of Resistance: Standards and the Effectiveness of Citizen Science,
35 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 244 (2015); Rebecca Lave, The Future of Environmental
Expertise, 105 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 244 (2015); ROBERT GELLMAN,
WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. SCHOLARS, CROWDSOURCING, CITIZEN SCIENCE AND THE
LAW: LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING FEDERAL AGENCIES 3 (2015), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/executive_summary_gellman.pdf
[https://perma.cc/995D-WF8D].
59
See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Data Governance and Informational Privacy:
Constructing “Indigenous Data Sovereignty,” 80 MONT. L. REV. 229 (2019).
60
Id. at 244–45.
61
Id.
62
See Sabrina Imbler, Training the Next Generation of Indigenous Data Scientists,
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/29/science/indigenous-datamicrobiome-science.html [https://perma.cc/H2SD-X9L2].
63
Tsosie, supra note 59, at 233–34.
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law than in other legal fields.64 Some have suggested that this may derive from
environmental data being published in inaccessible formats or venues.65 Making
environmental data available to researchers is particularly important as federal
agencies increasingly turn to adaptive management strategies.66 Commercial entities
rely on environmental data for many services, from weather prediction to industrial
plant management. Private industry demand can play a critical role in creating data
markets and enabling new ways of funding public environmental data collection.
3. The Role of Government in Environmental Data
Historically, the government has taken on the role of gathering and
disseminating environmental data.67 This makes sense: the EPA and other agencies
need baseline information to effectively make rules, and no one else is collecting the
relevant, comprehensive data that are needed.68 Ambient monitoring, in particular,
fulfills an essential public function.69
U.S. environmental regulation is embedded with requirements for gathering
environmental data.70 The major environmental laws of the 1970s created mandates
for many different types of data collection, both enforcement-oriented monitoring to
ensure industrial facilities were meeting regulatory targets and ambient monitoring
aimed at establishing environmental baselines.71
The regulations of the 1970s did not foresee many of our problems with
environmental data collection. Resource and logistical constraints to gathering
sufficient data have proven insurmountable for agencies. The Clean Water Act, for
example, requires that federal and state agencies monitor all the waters of the U.S.

64
See Robert L. Fischman & Lydia Barbash-Riley, Empirical Environmental
Scholarship, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 767 (2018).
65
See Michael Faure, Effectiveness of Environmental Law: What Does the Evidence
Tell Us?, 36 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 293, 295 (2012); Charuleka Varadharajan,
Shreyas Cholia, Cory Snavely, Valerie Hendrix, Christina Procopiou, Diana Swantek,
William J. Riley & D. A. Agarwal, Launching an Accessible Archive of Environmental Data,
EOS.ORG (Jan. 8, 2019), https://eos.org/science-updates/launching-an-accessible-archiveof-environmental-data [https://perma.cc/P9YB-6963].
66
Fischman & Barbash-Riley, supra note 64, at 803 (“A high priority for environmental
law must be to build into implementation the monitoring that can determine whether the
models employed in the front-end analyses accurately predicted outcomes.”).
67
Biber, supra note 4, at 46.
68
See Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and
the Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1728–29 (2007); William V.
Luneburg, Where the Three Rivers Converge: Unassessed Waters and the Future of EPA’s
Total Maximum Daily Load Program—A Case Study, 24 J.L. & COM. 57, 58–59 (2004).
69
Biber, supra note 4, at 5.
70
See, e.g., Flood Insurance Program, 44 C.F.R. § 60.3 (requiring developer to provide
floodplain study data when requesting permit); Clean Air Act § 412, 42 U.S.C. § 7651k.
71
See generally Biber, supra note 4, at 14–15 (discussing the distinction between
compliance and ambient environmental monitoring).
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annually.72 In practice, only about 1/3 of these waters are actually monitored.73 There
is no baseline information on even the most basic questions, for instance, what
percentage of U.S. national waters are part of marine protected areas.74
Environmental data is particularly important as environmental management
shifts increasingly towards an adaptive management model.75 Adaptive management
requires managers to collect extensive data that enable rigorous analysis of
ecosystem and management outcomes.76 This data is essential to understand whether
management programs are achieving their desired goals and, if they are not, to allow
these programs to adapt in the trial-and-error process envisioned by adaptive
management proponents.
Our current legislatively created data systems not only fail to fill the data gaps
they were designed to remedy; they also systemically exclude external participation
in environmental decision-making.
Public involvement holds a special place in environmental regulation, with
most major environmental laws allowing citizen suits.77 Citizen enforcement
provides an avenue for the public to meaningfully engage with environmental laws
beyond the typical notice and comment process. Scholars have recognized the
importance of this function in promoting democratic values.78 Citizens are a critical
72

33 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(5). The mileage of rivers and streams in the U.S. totals over 3.5
million miles and the acreage of lakes and ponds total over 41 million acres. Oliver A. Houck,
The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TMDLs and the Chesapeake Bay, 41 ENV’T L.
REP. 10208, 10212 (2011).
73
William V. Luneburg, Where the Three Rivers Converge: Unassessed Waters and the
Future of EPA’s TMDL Program: A Case Study, 24 J. LAW COMMER. 57 (2004); Houck, supra
note 72, at 10212.
74
Jennifer Sletten, Mimi D’Iorio, Mary G. Gleason, Alex Driedger, Timothé Vincent,
Claire Colgrove, Dawn Wright & Virgil Zetterlind, Beyond the Boundaries: How RegulationCentered Marine Protected Area Information Improves Ocean Protection Assessments,
MARINE POL’Y, Feb. 2021, at 1 (discussing the use of new GIS techniques to generate
baseline information on what levels of marine protection exist in different areas).
75
For discussions of the trend towards adaptive management in environmental law, see
generally Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46
AKRON L. REV. 933 (2013) [hereinafter Biber, Adaptive Management]; J. B. Ruhl & Robert
L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424 (2011); Holly
Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455 (2010);
Fischman, supra note 50.
76
Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 75, at 429 (“[M]anagement policy must put a premium
on collecting information, establishing measurements of success, monitoring outcomes,
using new information to adjust existing approaches . . . .”).
77
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (citing the Citizen Suit provision of the Clean Water Act);
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (citing the Citizen Suit provision of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (citing the Citizen Suit provision of the Clean Air Act).
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Barton H. Thompson Jr., The Continuing Innovations of Citizen Enforcement, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 188 (2000) (“By permitting citizens to monitor and prosecute
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part of the environmental monitoring infrastructure in the United States. Volunteer
water quality monitors are a cornerstone of the Clean Water Act’s monitoring
program and support regional waterkeeper efforts.79 Air quality monitoring by
citizens has been used to detect major pollution violations.80 However, the data
collected by these members of the public generally remain inaccessible inside
government datasets. When it is made available, it is often in formats that require
significant scientific expertise to access and analyze. Government data—including
those from government-funded research—on environmental conditions should be
shared with the public.
Government data sources and storage are vulnerable to concealment or neglect
amid changing administrations and priorities.81 The result is that, historically, neither
managers nor the public have had sufficient data to make informed environmental
management decisions.82 Our choices have been based on scientific evidence that is
the best available but lacks the spatial and temporal resolution to make accurate
decisions.83
The current environmental data systems made some amount of sense when they
were created in the 1970s. Industry was concerned that making data public would
lead to either commercially sensitive data being disclosed to competitors or bring
increased public scrutiny of their activities.84
The EPA held similar concerns.85 If the public found out how short the EPA
was falling in meeting its legislatively mandated monitoring goals, there would
likely have been much quicker public scrutiny. In the case of the Clean Water Act,
it took until the early 1990s, nearly 20 years after the Act was passed, before citizen
suits targeted the agency for lack of action on ambient monitoring.86 The EPA
benefitted from a system where data was difficult to find and, for the most part,
closely held.
Simply opening enforcement channels to citizens gives them a voice that is crucial to the
stature and power of private citizens in a democratic society.”).
79
Ashlee Jollymore, Morgan J. Haines, Terre Satterfield & Mark S. Johnson, Citizen
Science for Water Quality Monitoring: Data Implications of Citizen Perspectives, 200 J.
ENV’T MGMT. 456 (2017).
80
See, e.g., Overdevest & Mayer, supra note 58, at 1494, 1510.
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Sarah Lamdan, Lessons from Datarescue: The Limitations of Grassroots Climate
Change Data and the Need for Federal Records Law Reform, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
231, 239–240, 244 (2017).
82
See generally Biber, supra note 4, at 23.
83
Id. at 22; Esty, supra note 3, at 132–33 (citing the invisible buildup of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases as a paradigmatic example).
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Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1631–
1659 (2004) (discussing the reasons industry actors resist sharing information on their
activities).
85
Biber, supra note 4, at 48–51 (describing agency hesitancy to engage in or disclose
monitoring results when it may raise awareness of new environmental problems).
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Oliver A Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework for the Clean Water Act’s Ambient
Standards Program, 28 ENV’T L. REP. 10415, 10415–43 (1998).
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The confidentiality concerns of industry and the desire of the EPA to avoid
public scrutiny became the foundation for how environmental data is gathered and
accessed to this day. These concerns may have become less pressing over time, but
inertia keeps data systems intact.
The result is data systems that are public in name only. Basic data on
environmental conditions is unavailable to communities that need it to understand
and manage their own resources. This exacerbates existing inequalities, raising
issues of environmental justice and inclusion. While many environmental agencies
and regulations require stakeholder consultation and incorporation of traditional
knowledge where possible, the data systems that these agencies use to make
decisions systemically exclude many stakeholders.87
The EPA and others make implicit arguments that only certain types of data are
useful to members of the public. For instance, data that indicates unsafe bacterial
levels in local waters is used to determine when beaches should be closed.88 More
technical data is much less likely to be shared when it is not tied to specific public
needs.
However, current technological capabilities are expanding the analytical ability
of members of the public. While historically only a few scientists or government
agencies may have had the technical expertise needed to interpret and understand
environmental data, this is no longer the case.
4. Technology Is Driving a New Era in Environmental Data
Technology is fundamentally changing the potential for data collection, data
management, and stakeholder engagement at all points of the data supply chain. We
are in the midst of an explosion in new environmental data from the proliferation of
new observing systems, the ability to draw on social media and other sources, and,
with the hyper-connectivity of 5G and other communications advances, the rapid
expansion of an environmental “internet of things.”89 Artificial Intelligence (AI) and
other emerging processing techniques create the prospect of assimilating these data
streams in new ways, bringing a radically new understanding of global ecosystems.90
The “always on, always connected” environment could soon be a reality. The same
87
See, e.g., Kelsey Leonard, Putting Indigenous Place-Names and Languages Back on
Maps, ESRI: ARCNEWS (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.esri.com/about/newsroom/arcnews/put
ting-indigenous-place-names-and-languages-back-on-maps/ [https://perma.cc/B79P-7SSK]
(“[T]he absence of Indigenous participation in broader ocean planning forums has a deep
connection to our erasure in maps. If we are not on maps, we usually don’t have a seat at the
table. And there is no justice for Indigenous Peoples if we are not participating in the
decision-making that affects our territories.”).
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Luneburg, supra note 68, at 78–79.
89
See Macey, supra note 4, at 1665–67 (outlining the ways in which new technologies
are being used to collect environmental data).
90
See, e.g., William Boyd, Environmental Law, Big Data, and the Torrent of
Singularities, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 544, 551–54 (2016) (describing “The Age of
Big Data” in environmental management, spanning from the 2010s–2030s).
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advances spurring new opportunities for scientific data collection present parallel
opportunities to improve oversight of human activity at global and local scales.
Technology has changed what scope of data collection is possible, and big data
initiatives abound.91 The private and philanthropic sectors are driving many of these
advancements.92 Government agencies are also beginning to employ new tools but
have been limited by historical conceptions of what is possible that are built into
regulatory structures. Air quality regulations, for example, are based on the fallacy
that the direct measurement of emissions is impossible.93 While this was true when
the Clean Air Act was passed, it no longer is. Relying on outdated assumptions about
what data is possible to collect hampers environmental decision-making at all levels.
Technology is also enabling innovations in environmental management
regimes. In recent years, rights-based management and dynamic management have
shown notable promise in overcoming complex environmental management
problems.94 In the private sector, the transparency and traceability enabled by
technological advancements can drive incentive shifts.95 Emerging technologies
enable these tools, creating the potential for more robust and nimble management.
Over the course of history, advances in technology have generally led to
increased exploitation of the environment. Current mineral exploitation in the ocean
is only possible because new, sophisticated robotics can descend to previously
impossible depths.96 These new capabilities thus come with two imperatives. The
first is management—as the ability to exploit resources expands, effective
management of resources will be ever more vital. The second is accountability—
information on resource conditions and use must be public so that users of public
resources are accountable to governments and markets.
Just as new technologies are enabling better data collection to support
innovations in management, they are also enabling a new era of public transparency.
Data that was once stored on hard drives in government agencies can now easily be
shared through new tools, from blockchain to cloud-based computing.97 These
infrastructure advances are enabling calls for a new era of open environmental data.
Opening environmental data to the public has powerful potential. Agencies
standing alone often struggle to design data collection programs that ask and answer
the right questions.98 Opening up data to the public in some cases may lead to better
91
Linda K. Breggin & Judith Amsalem, Big Data and the Environment: A Survey of
Initiatives and Observations Moving Forward, 44 ENV’T L. REP. 10984, 10987–91 (2014).
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See, e.g., Yafit Lev-Aretz, Data Philanthropy, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1491, 1491 (2019)
(discussing the rise of private sector data being used for public benefits).
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Adam Babich, The Unfulfilled Promise of Effective Air Quality and Emissions
Monitoring, 7 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 569, 570 (2018).
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See Ardron et al., supra note 57, at 59.
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98
Biber, supra note 4, at 27–31.

144

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

and more rigorous analysis than relying on government scientists alone. Government
agencies are notoriously unable to effectively integrate new sources of
environmental data.99 Resources are limited, and agency scientists aren’t generally
able to research questions out of curiosity. Members of the public, including new
private enterprises, have more flexibility to pursue these questions. Expanding data
access to the public increases the opportunities for environmental data analysis and
understanding.
The public asks different questions of data than regulators do. These questions
sometimes yield a better understanding of environmental conditions. In the past,
environmental non-profits and members of the public have provided some of the
most forward-looking, innovative solutions to environmental problems.100 Providing
these actors with the data they need to engage with environmental decision-making
can help improve environmental outcomes.
The EPA and other agencies have begun to make public statements about the
importance of open data and stakeholder engagement. In 2015, the EPA itself noted
this shift, recognizing that new data tools could provide near real-time data not just
to managers but to members of the public.101 These statements remain largely lip
service: the reality is that our current data structures make open data and meaningful
stakeholder engagement effectively impossible. Implementing open data principles
will require a complete reworking of how federal agencies treat environmental data.
However, efforts to introduce data transparency can hide ulterior motives.102
Under the guise of ensuring public transparency, the Secret Science Reform Act
prevented the EPA from basing any rule-making decisions on science that was not
transparent or reproducible.103 Outwardly, the argument for this law was that it
ensured the science that the EPA used was sound by making it open to scrutiny from
the public. In practice, it severely undermined the EPA’s decision-making abilities.
The EPA was prevented from using critical classes of data, for instance health data,
because of confidentiality requirements that prevent these data from being made
public.104
More government data transparency increases the power of the public but can
also lead to increased power for corporate actors. In fact, more sophisticated private
99
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actors are potentially able to benefit more from open data developments.105 Data that
is transparent is easier to challenge. Corporations with large existing teams of data
scientists can reanalyze existing datasets with different assumptions and uncertainty
factors, providing new tools to challenge federal regulatory decisions. The
Climategate email scandal of 2009 showed the danger of exposing internal scientific
debate to the public and provided fodder for those wishing to undermine climate
science.106 Similar issues may occur when opening new datasets to the public.
The Climategate emails reflected a truth of the scientific process: debate over
outcomes is a constant and required piece of scientific advancement.107 Exposing
these debates publicly can provide the grounds for adversarial actors to challenge
outcomes. This same reality holds true for agency decision-making, which requires
considerable debate and balancing of competing priorities. Complete transparency
over these processes has real dampening effects on the ability of agency members
and scientists to engage in the robust and sometimes critical dialogue necessary to
ensure good regulation.
Too much transparency can be detrimental in other ways to agencies and the
public. Transparency is costly to agencies.108 Databases require significant resources
to create and maintain. Although increasing transparency can also lead to greater
public engagement, it also carries with it time costs for the agency that must handle
this engagement. Prioritizing transparency will necessarily come at a cost to other
worthwhile efforts.
Too much transparency can also make lay engagement difficult. Opening
datasets can rapidly lead to floods of data that overwhelm the public and fail to
provide meaningful information. Integrating newly released datasets into existing
databases can help with these issues.
Even when the public is provided with meaningful data, this does not always
drive changes in regulatory outcomes. Citizen-driven monitoring of air quality, for
example, dramatically improved public understanding and participation in
environmental enforcement.109 However, without comprehensive integration of
these programs into environmental management, they made little difference in
enforcement outcomes.110
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Environmental data systems have escaped scrutiny for decades. They can no
longer continue to do so in the face of rapid social, environmental, and technological
changes. We must now rethink how we gather, store, and publish environmental
data.111 The choices that regulators make in creating these systems will determine
who has a seat at the decision-making table.
New technological capabilities have prompted considerable legal thought on
how to fill data gaps and improve environmental monitoring.112 However, little
attention has been paid to how our current regulatory structures can facilitate or
restrict the incorporation of these advancements.113 In the face of increasing calls for
open environmental data, we must rethink how environmental data is structured. Too
often these calls frame the issue primarily as a choice: federal agencies simply need
to choose to share their data with the public. In practice, moving from current data
systems to more open ones require significant restructuring and reinterpreting of
regulation itself. In many cases, opening up data systems may not be possible
without reconsidering the fundamental definitions of why governments collect data.
III. FISHERIES DATA SYSTEMS
This Article uses fisheries management as a case study to understand how
regulatory artifacts limit data-driven decision-making and prevent stakeholder
engagement in environmental management. Emerging technologies highlight and
exacerbate flaws in existing regulatory structures. While real-time, high-quality
environmental data collection is more achievable and cost-effective than ever
before, outdated regulatory data architectures are preventing the uptake and use of
new data sources. Ultimately, this undermines the effectiveness of environmental
regulation and limits meaningful stakeholder participation.
Fisheries are a cornerstone of the U.S. food supply. Together, U.S. commercial
and recreational fisheries account for over $210 billion in sales annually.114 Fisheries
have always been subject to extreme fluctuations in productivity as the result of
human and environmental pressures. However, climate change and increasing global
populations are threatening the health and sustainability of fish stocks more than
ever before.115 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
111
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estimates that over one-third of global fish stocks are critically overfished, with an
additional 60% being fished at capacity.116 Ensuring that fisheries remain healthy in
the long run is important both economically and socially, with many areas turning
to fish as a critical source of protein for growing populations.117
Legislation regarding fisheries recognizes the importance of maintaining
healthy fish stocks. The Magnuson-Stevens Act,118 the primary fisheries
management regulation in the United States, mandates that “[c]onservation and
management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing
basis, the optimum yield from each fishery.”119
Fisheries managers are tasked with putting in place measures that will ensure
optimum sustainable yields over time. This requires balancing the competing
priorities of maximizing short-term economic gain for fishing communities and
ensuring that fish populations remain healthy enough to continue replenishing
themselves at a sustainable rate. Balancing these priorities requires managers to
make difficult decisions with significant economic consequences for fishing
communities, including restricting catches and even closing entire fisheries.
Fisheries managers are often forced to make these highly controversial decisions
using incomplete data.120 This results in decisions that do not always achieve the
Magnuson-Stevens goal of preventing overfishing.121
K. Baum, Trevor A. Branch, Jeremy S. Collie, Christopher Costello, Michael J. Fogarty,
Elizabeth A. Fulton, Jeffrey A. Hutchings, Simon Jennings, Olaf P. Jensen, Heike K. Lotze,
Pamela M. Mace, Tim R. McClanahan, Cóilín Minto, Stephen R. Palumbi, Ana M. Parma,
Daniel Ricard, Andrew A. Rosenberg, Reg Watson & Dirk Zeller, Rebuilding Global
Fisheries, 325 SCI. 578 (2009); see generally Daniel Pauly & Dirk Zeller, Catch
Reconstructions Reveal that Global Marine Fisheries Catches Are Higher than Reported
and Declining, 7 NAT. COMMC’NS 1 (2016), http://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms10244
[https://perma.cc/3P32-4B7Z].
116
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N., THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE
96 (2018).
117
CHRISTOPHER COSTELLO, LING CAO & STEFAN GELCICH, HIGH LEVEL PANEL
SUSTAINABLE OCEAN ECON., THE FUTURE OF FOOD FROM THE SEA 28 (2019) (noting that
“[s]eafood consumption per capita has more than doubled since 1961,” and “[t]otal global
consumption of seafood is projected to increase by 20 percent . . . by 2030”).
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16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–91d.
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See id. § 1851(a)(1).
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See Blasco et al., supra note 16, at 1(“[W]hile fisheries management is improving
in many areas there remain key gaps in data resolution that are critical for fisheries
assessments and conservation of aquatic systems into the future.”); Monica Medina & Scott
Nuzum, Electronic Reporting and Monitoring in Fisheries: Data Privacy, Security, and
Management Challenges and 21st-Century Solutions, 49 ENV’T L. REP. 10670, 10675 (2019)
(“One of the most significant gaps in the current regime is the dearth of up-to-date
information related to the quantity and location of catches. The lack of quality data, in turn,
compromises the quality of FMPs and means that NOAA is not meeting the mandates
outlined in the national standards.”).
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See Medina & Nuzum, supra note 120, at 10672–73 (describing the history of
overfished stocks in the United States).
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Fish stocks have fluctuated wildly in the past century, almost entirely as a result
of human fishing activity and fisheries management decisions.122 Historically, this
fluctuation was generally caused by a lack of complete scientific understanding of
fishery ecosystems combined with political pressure for managers to set fish takes
as high as possible to help fishing communities survive economically.
Today, we have much more scientific data on fisheries and the supporting
ecosystems than ever before, but outdated data systems do not provide adequate data
to fisheries managers and systematically exclude participation by stakeholders. The
result is management decisions that continually fail to achieve optimum sustainable
yield. This section looks at how fisheries data is currently collected and managed by
NOAA, arguing that current data systems lead to scientifically suboptimal data and
increased tension between government managers and external stakeholders. It then
looks at emerging fisheries management innovations and argues that significant
changes are needed to fisheries data regulation to meet the goals of the MagnusonStevens Act.
A. Current Fisheries Data Structures
The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) recognizes that quality scientific
information is needed to support effective fisheries management.123 This

122

Unlike with agriculture, where droughts and other weather events can ruin a whole
season’s crop, fisheries are much more stable in the absence of human interference. A
particularly warm winter may cause fish populations to stay slightly further offshore. Natural
variations in the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cause species to migrate and fewer
fish to be present in certain areas. See generally Ray Hilborn, Ricardo Oscar Amoroso,
Christopher M. Anderson, Julia K. Baum, Trevor A. Branch, Christopher Costello, Carryn L.
de Moor, Abdelmalek Faraj, Daniel Hively, Olaf P. Jensen, Hiroyuki Kurota, L. Richard
Little, Pamela Mace, Tim McClanahan, Michael C. Melnychuk, Cóilín Minto, Giacomo
Chato Osio, Ana M. Parma, Maite Pons, Susana Segurado, Cody S. Szuwalski, Jono R.
Wilson & Yimin Ye, Effective Fisheries Management Instrumental in Improving Fish Stock
Status, 117 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 2218 (2020); see also ARNAUD BERTRAND, MATTHIEU
LENGAIGNE, KEN TAKAHASHI, ANGEL AVADÍ, FLORANCE POULAIN & CHRIS HARROD, FOOD
& AGRIC. ORG. U.N., EL NIÑO SOUTHERN OSCILLATION (ENSO) EFFECTS ON FISHERIES AND
AQUACULTURE vi (2020), https://doi.org/10.4060/ca8348en [https://perma.cc/75MU-PDZH]
(indicating that these natural variations in fish stocks account for a “-18.8% to +34.9%”
variation over time. Additionally, “La Niña [i]s associated with more extreme production
anomalies than neutral or El Niño events.”).
123
See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (“Conservation and management measures shall be
based upon the best scientific information available.”).
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information is obtained from fishermen,124 government observers,125 and
independent fisheries scientists,126 in addition to NOAA’s own staff.
1. Fisheries Data Collection
Fisheries data is collected onboard fishing vessels in several different ways.
The majority of data comes from fisheries observers. Observers are mandated in
most fisheries of the United States, with varying requirements for how many trips
observers are required to be present on.127 Observers are contracted government
employees who collect information on the fish brought on board, including species,
size, and other pertinent information.128 This observer data is the critical foundation
of fisheries stock assessments in the United States and globally.
There are significant downsides to the observer program. Fishing vessels must
pay for observers and find space for them to sleep and live on already crowded
vessels.129 Observers are onboard to record compliance with fishing regulations,
leading to tense interactions between observers and vessel crew.130 Moreover,
124

See id. § 1853(a)(5) (“[S]pecify[ing] . . . the pertinent data which shall be submitted
to the Secretary with respect to commercial, recreational, charter fishing, and fish processing
in the fishery, including, but not limited to, information regarding the type and quantity of
fishing gear used, catch by species in numbers of fish or weight thereof, areas in which
fishing was engaged in, time of fishing, [and] number of hauls”).
125
See id. § 1853(b)(8) (“[R]equir[ing] . . . one or more observers be carried on board
a vessel of the United States engaged in fishing for species that are subject to the plan, for
the purpose of collecting data necessary for the conservation and management of the
fishery”).
126
See id. § 1881(e)(1) (“The Secretary may use the private sector to provide vessels,
equipment, and services necessary to survey the fishery resources of the United States when
the arrangement will yield statistically reliable results.”).
127
See id. § 1853(b)(8); Read D. Porter, Fisheries Observers as Enforcement Assets:
Lessons from the North Pacific, 34 MARINE POL’Y 583, 583 (2010).
128
See generally National Observer Program, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN. FISHERIES, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/fisheries-observers/nationalobserver-program [https://perma.cc/DLK6-5WL4] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021) (explaining the
National Observer Program, which helps support data collection from fisheries, to support
fishery health and sustainability); Christopher Ewell, John Hocevar, Elizabeth Mitchell,
Samantha Snowden & Jennifer Jacquet, An Evaluation of Regional Fisheries Management
Organization At-Sea Compliance Monitoring and Observer Programs, MARINE POL’Y, Feb.
17, 2020, at 1 (discussing the role of observers in global fisheries).
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But see 16 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(8) (“[A] vessel shall not be required to carry an observer
on board if the facilities of the vessel for the quartering of an observer, or for carrying out
observer functions, are so inadequate or unsafe that the health or safety of the observer or
the safe operation of the vessel would be jeopardized.”).
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See Martin Purves, The Role of a Fisheries Observer, HUMAN RIGHTS SEA, July
2020, at 1, 4, https://www.humanrightsatsea.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/HRAS_Insigh
t-Briefing-Note_Role-of-Fisheries-Observer_JULY_2020_SP_LOCKED.pdf [https://perma
.cc/EHE7-955Z] (“If an observer discovers things they weren’t intended to know about, they
can face intimidation, threats, violence, and in the worst cases, murder.”).
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observers are not required to be on vessels all the time. Fishing vessels often operate
differently when observers are aboard, often making trips as short as possible. This
means that the data collected by observers is not particularly accurate in its
representation of actual fishing behavior.131 While fishermen are mostly concerned
about ensuring observers do not see them doing anything illegal, from an
environmental management standpoint, it is much more concerning that the
scientific data collected by observers may not be accurate due to temporary
behavioral changes.132
The majority of vessels do not have observer coverage, so data is obtained
primarily through self-reporting. Captains are responsible for logging data on when
and how long they fish and how much and of what species they catch.133 This
reporting is notoriously inaccurate or in analog forms that are difficult to assimilate
into management databases.134
Self-reports are combined with remote sensing technologies that track fishing
vessel movement. Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) are the most important of
these. These tamper-proof boxes are mandated on fishing vessels in most fisheries
of the U.S.135 VMS units use GPS to track vessel location and transmit this
information back to regulators in real-time at regular intervals.136 Some units have
sensors that can additionally record when fishing gear is deployed, but for the most
part, VMS units do not transmit data on where and when vessels are fishing.137 Nor
do they have data on what fish vessels catch. Functionality is limited, and observers
are needed to fill in the resulting data gaps.
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STATE MEASURES AGREEMENT 9–10 (2019) (examining how historically paper-based fishery
data systems might help better categorize data).
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See 50 C.F.R. § 600 (2019) (implementing the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act and setting overall federal regulation of VMS and typeapprovals); See, e.g., id. § 622.28 (2019) (setting VMS requirements for the Gulf of Mexico);
id. § 622.205 (2019) (setting VMS requirements for the South Atlantic Shrimp Fishery); id.
§§ 648.9–.10 (2019) (setting VMS requirements for the Northeastern United States); id. §
660.14 (2019) (setting VMS requirements for the Western United States).
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See id. § 600.1500.
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Beyond VMS, Automated Identification System (AIS) transmitters, originally
placed on vessels for safety purposes, also track fishing vessel location and are used
for some fisheries monitoring purposes.138 AIS data has lower temporal resolution
than VMS data and, importantly, can be turned off at any time. VMS is much
preferred as a data source for decision-making, but confidentiality concerns have
limited the dissemination of VMS data.139 In general, VMS data is only available to
regulators in the country a vessel is registered in, while AIS data can be made
available publicly.140
2. Data Use and Storage
Data from observers and VMS are gathered on fishing vessels under regulatory
mandates and transmitted directly to managers.141 This data is managed and stored
by NOAA. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) dictates the
length of time that various datasets must be stored with observer data subject to the
unusually stringent requirement of indefinite storage.142
Current MSA systems have created data silos within NOAA itself.143 Data is
collected and used for three major purposes: management, enforcement, and science.
Data collected primarily for enforcement, most notably VMS data, is managed,
stored, and administered by NOAA’s Office of Law Enforcement (OLE).144 Data
collected primarily for scientific purposes, including most observer and vessel selfreports, is transmitted to NOAA’s Fisheries Sampling Branch, where it is stored and
disseminated.145 Functionally, this data is not shared between departments.
3. Data Access and Sharing
Fisheries data is more sensitive than some other types of environmental data.146
Most regulated entities have some concerns that sharing data about their practices
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See 33 C.F.R. § 164.46(a) (2019). AIS units are not mandated under the MagnusonStevens Act, but by the U.S. Coast Guard under their mandate to regulate vessel safety. AIS
must be carried by all U.S. commercial vessels over 65 feet in length. See id. §
164.46(b)(1)(i) (2019).
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See BRETT, supra note 134, at 10.
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See id.
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See WESTFALL ET AL., supra note 137, at 10, 14.
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NOAA, NOAA RECORDS SCHEDULES CHAPTER 1500 – FISHERY AND LIVING
MARINE RESOURCE FUNCTIONAL FILES (2018). For a discussion of the costs imposed by this
lengthy storage requirement, see WESTFALL ET AL., supra note 137, at 11–14.
143
For a general overview, see PORCARO, supra note 1, at 7 tbl. 1a (detailing the
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may lead to further scrutiny or identification of illegal behavior.147 The fishing sector
shares these and other concerns, including that data on their vessel movements will
be used by other fishermen to identify prime fishing spots. Fishermen are successful
because of where and how they choose to fish—practices they have historically been
extremely secretive about. Particularly productive spots are highly guarded secrets,
as is knowledge on what areas are best to fish in response to various weather
conditions. This knowledge was the source of most major economic differentiation
between fishermen in the past.148 The same vessels leaving the same port for the
same amount of time could have dramatically different hauls based on where they
chose to go.149 Because of the importance of these trade secrets, fishermen can be
highly secretive about their location information and highly resistant to sharing it.150
Fisheries regulations were built to protect this commercially sensitive fisheries
location data.151 There wasn’t much other choice. When regulators first proposed
methods of collecting location data, there was near-universal outcry from fishermen.
Fishermen had legitimate concerns that if data on where they were fishing was
shared, it would invite competition for prime spots from other fishermen as well as
violate their own personal privacy concerns.152 Given that one of the primary goals
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, when it was first passed, was to protect U.S.
fishermen against intrusion by international fleets, Congress was extremely
receptive to these concerns.153
In response, managers created legislation that attempted to protect locational
confidentiality for fishermen.154 Data agreements stipulated that managers would not
share information unless it was anonymized by clumping data from a minimum of
three vessels together. Data was also not released until a certain amount of time had
passed.
147
See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and
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Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86
TEX. L. REV. 1409 (2008); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The
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(1998).
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(“Fishermen targeting the same species typically have dramatically different returns
depending on their location choice.”).
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Among Marine Lobstermen, 49 HUMAN ORG. 157 (1990) (discussing secrecy and
communication practices in the Maine lobster fishery).
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Medina & Nuzum, supra note 120, at 10680 (“[F]ishers fear that electronic
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See id. at 10673.
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Functionally, fishermen’s secrets were protected not only by regulatory
requirements but also by the reality that data moves through the federal government
extremely slowly. While not explicitly protected in fisheries regulation, the practice
of NMFS involves several lengthy steps for data transmission and storage. Data
collected by observers, for example, is first sent from the observers in analog form
to intermediary contractors before being sent to regional councils and NOAA, where
it is eventually processed and analyzed.155 The upshot is that it may be years before
data is available to the public. By this time, data is much less valuable or likely to
lead to commercially sensitive information being portrayed.
The data confidentiality systems that were put in place to protect individual
fishermen are now proving to be detrimental to fishing communities as a whole.
Fishermen do not have access to their own data, eliminating opportunities for any
kind of self-management or adaptation. The role of data in enabling stakeholder
engagement is particularly important under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which aims
to “encourage user-group self-regulation within legislatively prescribed scientific
and policy-based parameters.”156 Magnuson-Stevens is a “law without courts,”
reliant on agency administration, stakeholder involvement, and notably little judicial
review.157
This goal of Magnuson-Stevens is not being met. Fishermen often do not trust
managers to make well-informed decisions, which partially stems from past
examples of managers making ineffective decisions based on inaccurate or
incomplete data.158 In other cases, the management decisions may be sound but
managers have not worked effectively with local fishing communities to ensure
there is support and buy-in for decisions. This commonly plays out in scenarios
where fishermen are catching record hauls of fish, which they believe denotes
healthy and abundant stocks. Managers see record hauls as cause for concern,
indicating that more fish are being caught than their models have predicted.
Managers then place tighter restrictions on fishing quotas, confusing the fishermen
who see no reason for these restrictions in the face of such good catches. This
disconnect has many causes, but one of them is certainly communication of and
access to data.
Fishermen who are able to see the information being used as the basis for
management decisions are more likely to support management decisions and less
155

PORCARO, supra note 1 (detailing the data stream for observer data, which is first
collected by observers before being sent to the vendors they are employed by and then to
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Marian Macpherson & Mariam McCall, Judicial Remedies in Fisheries Litigation:
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ENV’T L. 381, 383 (2017).
158
The collapse of the Canadian Groundfish fishery is a classic example. See Anthony
T. Charles, Living with Uncertainty in Fisheries: Analytical Methods, Management
Priorities and the Canadian Groundfishery Experience, 37 FISHERIES RSCH. 37, 42–48
(1998).
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likely to engage in illegal activity.159 Nearly 90% of fish stocks globally are
overexploited due to ineffective management and illegal fishing.160 Illegal,
Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is a major contributor to this,
undermining efforts to sustainably manage ecosystems, threatening food security,
and facilitating human rights abuses.161 IUU costs the global economy over $23
billion in annual economic losses.162
Efforts to better manage fisheries and tackle IUU fishing have been stymied by
the difficulties of monitoring and enforcing in distant areas of the ocean. Current
solutions rely on human observers placed on fishing vessels to oversee catches and
report back to fisheries managers. The information gathered by observers is critical
to combatting IUU and ensuring sustainable fisheries. However, placing observers
on vessels is costly and exposes them to considerable safety risks, resulting in
limited coverage from current observers. The vast majority of fishing vessels have
no such oversight and can easily operate illegally with little chance of detection.
Improving monitoring technology coupled with better stakeholder engagement may
be able to stem this tide.
B. Technological Innovation Is Prompting a New Era in Management
Observers and VMS are still the cornerstones of fisheries data collection, but
this is changing rapidly. Improving technological capabilities are opening new doors
for how we understand and manage fisheries. These technologies are being
incorporated into existing regulatory structures in ways that limit their potential
usefulness. In this section, I look to understand both how new technologies can best
be used to support fisheries management and what needs to happen to our current
regulatory structures to allow this.
Rampant data gaps, particularly regarding what is actually happening on fishing
vessels, combined with a lack of public transparency, have defined our fisheries data
systems for decades. New technologies are changing both of these paradigms. Tools
like Global Fishing Watch are ushering in a new era of transparency by providing
the public with near-real-time location tracking for the majority of fishing vessels in
the world. In 2015, Google, Oceana, and SkyTruth came together to form Global
Fishing Watch (GFW), a tool intended to spur sustainability in the fisheries sector
through transparency.163 A suite of other tools known as electronic monitoring
enables new possibilities for the information that we collect on vessels themselves.
159
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This section looks at these two developments specifically as cornerstones of a new
era of fisheries management.
1. The Move Towards Public Transparency: Global Fishing Watch
Global Fishing Watch publishes near real-time locations of fishing vessels
around the world for free on their website.164 This type of tracking marked a
fundamental shift in how fisheries transparency was approached. Prior to Global
Fishing Watch’s publication, very little data on the fishing locations of fishing
vessels were publicly available. None of it was available in near-real-time. Prior to
its launch, academics and the private sector questioned what impact this
transparency would have.165
Global Fishing Watch’s impact has far exceeded expectations, spurring a new
culture of transparency in the fishing industry. GFW quickly became the darling of
the global ocean policy community, garnering recognition and high-profile
partnerships globally.166 Their idea was far from revolutionary but implementing it
well enabled critical new audiences to meaningfully engage with fisheries
management.
The majority of GFW data is drawn from AIS units and is consequently less
accurate than data available to in-country managers via VMS.167 However, a number
of countries have agreed to share their VMS data through the platform.168 This is
notable because it affords a much greater degree of transparency and shows a
willingness to move beyond the concerns over privacy that have limited location
data sharing in the past. The willingness of countries to share their fishing data has
been driven by a fundamental shift in the culture of fisheries: increasing
technological capabilities has rendered much of the need for secrecy effectively
moot. Whether countries want it or not, it is relatively easy for anyone with advanced
radar or satellite tools to tell exactly where their fleets are fishing at any given time.
Publishing this information more broadly to the public does little to impair their
164

Id.
See generally Aarti Gupta, Transparency in Global Environmental Governance: A
Coming of Age?, 10 GLOB. ENV’T POL., August 2010, at 6–8 (discussing the potential
negative impacts of transparency initiatives).
166
See, e.g., Sarah Bladen, U.S. Government and Nonprofit Organization Host Prize
Competition to Leverage the Latest Technology to Detect and Defeat Illegal Fishing, GLOB.
FISHING WATCH (Jul. 22, 2021), https://globalfishingwatch.org/press-release/usgovt-gfwxview3/ [https://perma.cc/5LFB-WXSL]; Kimbra Cutlip, Peter Benchley Ocean Awards:
Global Fishing Watch Partners Win Big, GLOB. FISHING WATCH (June 2, 2016),
https://globalfishingwatch.org/news-views/peter-benchley-ocean-awards-global-fishingwatch-partners-win-big/ [https://perma.cc/B8YX-2AED].
167
See Bjorn Bergman, Systematic Data Analysis Reveals False Vessel Tracks, GLOB.
FISHING WATCH (July 29, 2021), https://globalfishingwatch.org/data/analysis-reveals-falsevessel-tracks/ [https://perma.cc/WRC8-6BY3].
168
Transparency, GLOB. FISHING WATCH, https://globalfishingwatch.org/transparency/
[https://perma.cc/WU3K-4GS9] (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
165

156

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

commercial prospects while promoting a culture of transparency that may ultimately
help in the fight against illegal fishing.
Global Fishing Watch is introducing a new era of transparency for fisheries
data. This has had positive impacts throughout seafood supply chains. It has enabled
not only the public but scientific researchers to conduct revolutionary new studies
of fisheries activity.169 The advances in scientific research spurred by GFW’s
transparency are particularly notable, ostensibly because scientists are one
stakeholder group that federal regulators most easily provide data. In practice,
GFW’s uptake by the scientific community is evidence of how unworkable federal
data systems are.170 Government constraints, including confidentiality restrictions
and onerous review requirements, make the real-time publication of fisheries data
impossible.
2. Electronic Monitoring
For managers, understanding what is actually happening onboard fishing
vessels has been one of the largest information gaps in fisheries. Without observers
onboard, there has simply been no way to know when vessels are fishing, what
species or how much fish they are catching. This information is critical for scientific
assessments of fish populations and the resulting management decisions.
New tools are opening new possibilities for gathering data onboard fishing
vessels. Electronic monitoring (EM) technologies are at the center of present-day
discussions for how to incorporate new technology into fisheries management.171 At
its most basic, EM places video cameras on fishing vessels.172 EM systems record
footage that monitors when vessels are fishing. More complex systems are being
designed to capture information on what species are being caught and how many
fish are brought aboard.173 Coupling these video cameras with analysis driven by
automated machine learning, there is great potential to vastly increase the amount of
information regulators have available and fill existing gaps about what is happening
onboard fishing vessels.
However, NOAA has been slow to integrate EM into existing fisheries
management regimes. Current efforts are largely regionally driven, with some
169
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regions, such as the Pacific Northwest, driving early adoption of EM while the
majority of others lag behind.174 In some ways, this reflects the structure of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, which vests regional management councils with significant
flexibility in how they manage fisheries.175 However, the piecemeal approach to EM
adoption has hindered technological development because the market for EM
hardware remains small, while at the same time raising significant questions about
how EM fits in with federal management requirements that have yet to be answered.
NOAA’s slow incorporation of EM into existing fisheries regulation highlights
the flaws in how environmental data are currently collected and managed by federal
agencies. We need an integrated national framework that encourages technological
innovations. The legal structures needed to create it already exist. However, NOAA
is often limited by a desire to draw on and not deviate significantly from previous
regulatory efforts. In the case of EM, this means that NOAA rule-makers are looking
to VMS rules as a template for how EM should be regulated.
VMS rules, however, are not a robust template for EM regulation. VMS itself
is a case study for how a lack of technical expertise within NOAA led to the creation
of rules that have hindered technological advancement in the space. Within NOAA,
the division of technical expertise and legal expertise into different offices has
prevented the creation of comprehensive and forward-looking regulation. Using preexisting rules as a template to be modified when new technologies are developed
can allow NOAA to promulgate rules more quickly, but it also can promote technical
artifacts that are less efficient and ultimately de-incentivize technological innovation
in the long run.
Most relevantly from the data perspective, current rules segment technology,
and the data generated from it, by technology type and not by the data that are
ultimately collected.176 This means that different types of fisheries data, like those
originating from onboard observers and VMS, are sent to different NOAA offices
furthering existing data siloes and hampering even intra-agency data access.
Beyond NOAA, one of the largest questions as EM moves forward will be who
has access to EM data and how this access is facilitated. Data from other fisheries
technologies, notably VMS, is generally controlled end-to-end by the government
and not made available to other interests, including fishermen themselves. The
reasons for this current model have been at least partially legally driven: federal
fisheries law requires vessel and ecosystem data to fulfill management and
enforcement duties.177 The government thus collects and controls the majority of
data relevant to U.S. fisheries. Some of this data is eventually shared after regulators
use it, but much of it remains closely held by the government due to strict
interpretations of confidentiality laws.
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Going forward, EM and other fisheries technologies will be more useful and
well-adopted if they provide parallel data access to fishermen and others. Early work
by Digital Public and the Cape Cod Fisherman’s Forum details how parallel data
access systems for EM could work.178 In some systems, fishermen retain ownership
of their data, while in others, the government or vendors own data but grant access
to fishermen and other interested parties.179 NOAA should not determine a data
access system on the federal level, but it should enable these systems to be designed
at a regional or fishery level by ensuring that vendors, fishermen, and scientists are
allowed to access EM data.
Data access frameworks must be in line with existing confidentiality
regulations. The majority of these restrictions are currently driven by the fact that
EM data is classified as observer data. Creating a new data category for EM data is
the desirable outcome, but in the meantime, EM data is subject to the same
confidentiality regulations as observer data more broadly.180 NOAA has found in
emerging EM rules that third-party vendors are not subject to MSA confidentiality
requirements.181 In the West Coast groundfish EM program, third-party vendors may
share EM data with others if authorized by the vessel owner.182
Government managers must work with stakeholders to design the legal data
governance structures for EM data. These systems will be subject to existing
confidentially requirements, but beyond this, creating the legal frameworks that
govern EM data ownership and access will require developing new contractual
agreements between the relevant parties. To the extent that this moves beyond the
existing model of end-to-end government data control, developing these agreements
will add another layer of complexity to EM implementation. It is nonetheless
essential that federal EM regulation includes provisions that support and drive more
comprehensive data access systems.
EM is emerging into a piecemeal, historically driven regulatory landscape that
importantly will neither generate the necessary data nor engage the necessary
stakeholders to achieve NOAA goals without major revision. Combining these
historically driven policies with calls for open data has the potential to undermine
efforts to engage stakeholders and address environmental inequities.183 Unless major
changes are made, data will remain siloed within NOAA and not be used to support
management to the greatest extent possible. Fishermen will remain disconnected
from their data and excluded from meaningful participation in fisheries
management. Other external stakeholders will likewise be unable to take advantage
of the data-rich ecosystem that should inform environmental management.
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C. The Dangers of Government Dominated Environmental Data Systems
Fisheries data systems highlight issues that are prevalent throughout
environmental management. FEMA collects large volumes of data on sea level rise,
coastal storms, and other hazards.184 This data is used to help calculate flood risks
and insurance premiums and to determine where government infrastructure
investments should be made.185 However, the only pieces of this information that are
generally available to the public are very limited data on 100-year flood risks.186
Most consumers do not fully understand how to interpret these risks or know that
many orders of magnitude more sophisticated flood risk data could be available.
Providing this data to consumers interested in purchasing coastal property could
reduce government costs in the long run by deterring high-risk purchases. Some
NFIP data is available, though even sophisticated researchers note that it is
“messy.”187 Providing access to this data allows for new types of analyses and
understanding of flood risk potential.
Under the Clean Water Act, only a minimal amount of water quality data is
made available to the public. States are required to monitor all the waters within
their borders to determine if they meet water quality criteria.188 Data is reported to
the EPA and available to the public on the EPA website, including in map-based
form.189 However, available data is generally at least several years old and provides
only a broad categorization of whether a given water is impaired or not.190 This level
of information is not helpful in promoting transparency and public engagement.
These case studies illustrate the issues with government-dominated
environmental data systems. Government may be better equipped than any other
entity to provide the public good of collecting, storing, and disseminating
environmental data, but they should not do this alone. Allowing others to participate
in environmental data systems importantly generates better scientific outcomes,
reduces inequities, and fosters a more robust environmental management landscape.
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Environmental data is limited and, in many management contexts, limiting. The
norm of government data collection impedes further and more experimental data
sources from being included in environmental decision-making. Some sectors have
overcome this problem. For instance, volunteers have been critical contributors to
water quality monitoring under the Clean Water Act’s TMDL program for decades.
Including these additional sources creates more robust environmental databases and
has the potential to improve management outcomes.
However, including citizen science and other data types in regulatory decisionmaking raises important questions about data quality.191 Creating data systems that
can account for and mitigate these potential issues is not simple. And it requires
significant deviation from the current model of government collected environmental
data.
Government-dominated data systems also systemically exclude stakeholder
participation. The difficulty in accessing environmental data creates an ecosystem
that benefits highly sophisticated, technically savvy entities that are able to devote
the resources to making sense of messy data sources. For the most part, these are
large corporate players that have a commercial interest in having good data on
environmental conditions. Less technically savvy members of the public are often
shut out from engaging with environmental data because of its complexity. This
reality exacerbates existing unequal power structures and prevents meaningful
public engagement in resource protection.
New partnerships are beginning to allow the public better access to
environmental data. In the world of air quality data, the EPA’s partnership with the
private company PurpleAir has vastly expanded air quality data sources and
availability for the public.192 These efforts are largely public-private partnerships,
though, and without corporate interest and backing, many areas of environmental
data remain out of reach to members of the public.
IV. TOWARDS BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DATA SYSTEMS
Environmental regulation is built on outdated assumptions about how
environmental data can be gathered and how it should be used. Accelerating
technological change has brought these regulatory deficiencies to light. Much of
environmental regulation is built on the understanding that certain data cannot be
gathered and relies instead on models and other proxy methods to determine
environmental conditions on the basis of limited data.193 These constraints are no
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longer relevant, with new technologies and tools able to fill data gaps.194 However,
our regulatory systems have not changed in time with technological change. The gap
between what is technologically possible and what environmental regulation allows
is only widening.
This is true not just of the tools used to gather environmental data but also the
methods in which it is stored. Current regulatory systems for gathering and storing
environmental data were created when data was primarily collected with pen and
paper.195 It didn’t matter that data could take months to work its way through an
agency when decisions were made based on annually updated data.196 It also was not
of huge concern that data access schemes did not allow timely access for
stakeholders or members of the public because there was little demand.197 In the face
of real-time data availability and an expectation that management be dynamic and
transparent, these systems, which once operated at the same pace as the data around
them, are becoming the constraining factor on real-time data availability.
The private sector has stepped up in the face of government failure to provide
information to the public, in near-real time and in ways that are accessible even to
non-technical members of the public. Global Fishing Watch is one of many new,
private sector solutions that aim to provide the public with baseline information
about environmental conditions and the human impacts on them. In many cases,
these solutions fill gaps that could not currently be filled by government agencies,
which remain constrained by outdated data confidentiality restrictions and unwieldy
data management regimes.
Despite the growing role of the private sector in creating environmental data
solutions, the government remains the largest and most important provider of
environmental data. We must rethink how the government manages and uses this
data to ensure it remains effective into the future.198 We must change our data
systems to embody the priorities and capabilities of the 21st century. Drawing on
lessons from fisheries, I point here to several fundamental changes that are needed
to reshape how environmental data is understood, collected, and used at the federal
level.
A. Create Environmental Data Offices
The EPA and NOAA should each create an office devoted solely to data
assimilation, storage, and dissemination. These departments should not be charged
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with making any decisions based on data. Instead, they should focus on creating data
ecosystems that enable a new era of “data-rich regulation.”199 A single department
focused on data, an Environmental Data Office, is needed to end data silos that exist
within agencies, to improve the speed at which agencies process data, and to
disseminate this data to other federal regulators as well as members of the public.
Many government environmental grant programs now encourage that a certain
percentage of funds be devoted solely to data management.200 It is time federal
agencies also embrace this principle and commit resources to developing and
maintaining effective data structures.
Many of the current problems with environmental data systems are the result
of historical artifacts that shaped agency decisions in the past and are now embedded
in how these agencies manage data.201 In many cases, a thoughtful and complete
reworking of these systems is necessary. This has the potential to be a resourceintense endeavor, but it is one that even those within EPA and NOAA have
recognized is necessary to overcome existing inefficiencies.202
In the next ten years, frontier efforts will see siloed data systems combined in
a “digital ecosystem for the environment” that aggregates many sources of data to
provide high-quality information to decision-makers in real time.203 This digital
ecosystem is being championed for its potential to overcome existing constraints
built into single-issue and geographically limited data tools by providing a
comprehensive picture of environmental conditions globally.
These new systems must overcome the existing barriers to effective knowledge
transfer between scientists and policymakers and ensure that data ecosystems cover
the social architecture of how people interact with and use data. Many examples
show that even when managers are provided with high-quality information, data
must be available in formats that integrate with existing workflows and align with
organizational incentives; otherwise, they are not used.204 Even the smallest
difficulty in accessing information (for instance, a delay of one-quarter of a second
in a webpage loading) leads to significant declines in use.205 Understanding the
important role of knowledge translation between scientific data and policy-relevant
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information is critical to designing effective systems going forward. Environmental
Data Offices are needed to create data expertise and design these systems.
Other academics have called for offices within EPA devoted solely to carrying
out environmental monitoring.206 Environmental Data Offices should build on the
goals of providing centralized oversight of monitoring to include all data, from that
collected directly by agency scientists to outside data submitted to the agency as part
of compliance monitoring.
Environmental Data Offices should be the first stop for any data entering the
federal government, regardless of its source or destination. Data can be cleaned by
data scientists and aggregated into one central system that allows dissemination to
whatever individual office needs specific datasets. More advanced systems could
use data tagging to automatically transmit data to the relevant offices. Any
government manager could determine if needed data exists and easily access it by
querying the data office.
Environmental Data Offices can provide expertise to other parts of the agency
and the federal government. For instance, data offices should work with other
departments to develop data-oriented standards. Data standards should build on
existing global efforts to promote data standardization and interoperability. Creating
standard formats and quality margins instead of prescribing particular methods
allows flexibility in how data is collected at the same time as it ensures that data can
be easily aggregated.
Environmental Data Offices have the potential to vastly increase the efficiency
and effectiveness of data use by federal agencies. Staff members whose jobs are
heavily devoted to data management are currently scattered throughout agencies,
often with insufficient support or resources to effectively manage complex data
ecosystems. Many of these individuals may end up dealing with the same datasets
as others, doing redundant analysis and aggregation. Creating Environment Data
Offices that concentrate these resources together and decrease redundancy could
dramatically improve data systems.
B. Rethink Environmental Data Confidentiality
The environmental regulations of the 1970s were written at a time when
corporate confidentiality concerns were paramount. Any kind of environmental
surveillance and monitoring was a departure from the status quo and garnered a great
deal of pushback from regulated entities.207 Things have changed in the fifty years
since then. Compliance monitoring is now a well-accepted, if not well-loved, norm
in environmental regulation.208
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The years since the 1970s have brought technological innovations that enable
more sophisticated government surveillance of industry.209 Government use of these
technologies, for instance, near-surface aerial surveillance, has withstood many
Fourth Amendment challenges.210 The result of these shifts is that regulated entities
expect far less privacy for their operations than they did in the 1970s.211 This shift
in corporate expectations of privacy has not been reflected in any changes in how
environmental monitoring takes place or how government agencies view data
confidentiality.212 Environmental laws are still designed to protect interests that no
longer legally need to be protected.
Some efforts to open specific environmental datasets have been successful. For
instance, military satellite images from the Cold War era have been declassified in
the past decade, providing a rich source of information to study changes in climate
and land use.213 While some data may be declassified after requests from scientists,
larger problems stem from the fact that most scientists and managers simply have
no idea what datasets have been collected by disparate government projects. Without
the baseline knowledge of what data exists, it is impossible to ask for access to this
data. Furthermore, it creates inefficient duplication of efforts as scientists devote
significant resources to gathering data that may have already been collected by
others. The first step in unlocking these datasets should be in providing a
comprehensive overview of what datasets currently exist, a job for newly formed
Environmental Data Offices.
Decreased corporate and societal expectations of privacy are coupled with
increasing calls for transparency and open data.214 Open data advocates argue that
in order to realize the full value of data, it needs to be shared. Few, if any, entities
lose in an open data ecosystem. Instead, making data open and accessible to broad
audiences creates new insights and ways of using this data. Open data hold particular
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promise when it comes to environmental sources. Environmental data is generally
less susceptible to privacy concerns than many other datasets.215 And this kind of
data is relevant to many seeking to learn more about the environmental conditions
around them.
The benefits of open data in the environmental world are clear. Coupled with
decreased corporate expectations of privacy, there is little standing in the way of
rethinking how environmental data is managed. It is time to change the default for
environmental data. Instead of defaulting to confidentiality, with a few exceptions
when data can be shared,216 the default should be that environmental data is shared
openly.
Opening environmental data is not simple. Data collected by NOAA and the
EPA are used by scientists globally to address and understand major environmental
threats.217 This data is already made available, but we must move beyond putting
data on a website and hoping for the best.218 The majority of environmental datasets
are inaccessible to those without scientific or technical training.219 Making data
meaningfully open will require legislative action and the implementation of new
rules.220
Government provisions requiring open data about the oceans should be viewed
as an important public good, but the costs associated with this can be significant. In
addition to the direct economic costs, additional indirect costs of open data related
to access, equity, and participation also need to be considered in relation to the
purpose and potential benefits of open access data.221 For environmental data,
opening data can enable new models to support research and management databases.
Existing research databases employ several main revenue models to support their
ongoing costs. The majority rely on public funding from governments, universities,
or other research institutions, with a minority also generating revenue through use
and access fees.222
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The cost of storing large quantities of data can be prohibitively high. Several
creative solutions exist. NOAA, for instance, through its Big Data Project, reached
an agreement with Amazon Web Services (AWS) for storage of key ocean data.223
For AWS, storing NOAA data supported key knowledge services and made it
possible to subsequently reduce costs due to lower computing requirements by
bringing the stored data significantly closer to the computation. In return, NOAA
was able to store large quantities of data for free on the AWS servers and saw large
increases in public use of this data.224
Opening access to environmental data is particularly crucial for ensuring that
stakeholders who are supplying data, like fishermen, retain access to their own data.
One of the more interesting developments catalyzed by new technologies is the
return to relevance of traditional self-governance tools. Work by Elinor Ostrom and
others shows that self-governance under the right conditions can be one of the most
effective ways to manage common-pool resources.225 Access to information
facilitated by new technologies has the potential to enable a new era of selfmanagement, in which individual actors and communities can make decentralized
resource consumption decisions.
New data systems that are built around “portal and download” with little regard
to how data will be used within a framework of user-driven services provide a
potential template for future open environmental data projects.226 A fundamental
rethinking of data systems architecture where data is democratized can enable users
to build their own knowledge systems. In a sense, rather than a pre-defined data
organization structure, data would reside in tagged, unstructured data lakes where
the schema are written as the data are accessed. Much as data lakes are transforming
machine learning and analytics, a similar development environment needs to be
created for environmental observing systems that would enable knowledge services
to be driven by the user.
We must move away from outdated understandings of data confidentiality and
toward open environmental data ecosystems. Federal agencies can enable this move
by leveraging data expertise in Environmental Data Offices to use new tools and
infrastructures to realize the vision of the digital ecosystem for the environment.
This ecosystem is needed to effectively engage stakeholders and achieve sustainable
management goals.
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V. CONCLUSION
We are in the middle of an explosion in new methods of collecting
environmental data, creating enormous potential for advances in our understanding
and stewardship of natural resources. An exponential increase in the number and
variety of environmental observing systems and other new data sources has created
the prospect of a “digital ecosystem” for the environment. Advances in processing
techniques and visualization are rapidly expanding our ability to extract information
from those data and present these in meaningful ways to both technical and nontechnical audiences.
Taking advantage of these innovations will require environmental agencies to
move away from archaic models of managing data towards methods that allow for
near real-time data assimilation and access. Expertise in the form of Environmental
Data Offices is needed to create these shifts.
We must also rethink the culture of confidentiality built into environmental
regulation. Much environmental data is now locked in the servers of government
agencies, businesses, or researchers. Data holders should establish, and governments
should require, a new default—that environmental data are broadly available to other
users. Radical transparency of data from fishing and other resource use can allow
the public to hold governments accountable for their management of environmental
resources and create opportunities for resource users to engage in self-governance.

